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Abstract
A Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) is one where nodes can be highly mobile, with long message
delay times forming dynamic and fragmented networks. Traditional centralised network
security is difficult to implement in such a network, therefore distributed security solutions are
more desirable in DTN implementations. Establishing effective trust in distributed systems
with no centralised Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) such as the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
scheme usually requires human intervention. Our aim is to build and compare different de-
centralised trust systems for implementation in autonomous DTN systems. In this paper, we
utilise a key distribution model based on the Web of Trust principle, and employ a simple
leverage of common friends trust system to establish initial trust in autonomous DTN’s. We
compare this system with two other methods of autonomously establishing initial trust by
introducing a malicious node and measuring the distribution of malicious and fake keys. Our
results show that the new trust system not only mitigates the distribution of fake malicious
keys by 40% at the end of the simulation, but it also improved key distribution between
nodes. This paper contributes a comparison of three de-centralised trust systems that can
be employed in autonomous DTN systems.
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1. Introduction
Recent applications of Delay Tolerant or Disruption Tolerant Networks (DTN) in Mobile
Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETS) (Omar et al., 2009), interplanetary space networks (Farrell
and Cahill, 2006; Fall, 2003; Burleigh et al., 2003), frontline battlefield networking (Jia et al.,
2012) and vehicular networks (Fall, 2003; Lin et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2009b), have shown
that applying traditional network security practices are unsuitable for DTN. In traditional
networks such as the Internet, it is assumed that there is a complete and continuous source to
destination path, with low delay times and low probability of packet loss (Zhu et al., 2009a).
PKI, are easily implemented to help with creating secure communication channels. Low delay
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times for messages allow the negotiation of session keys to facilitate a secure channel for mes-
sage transfer between the source and destination nodes. In contrast, DTN have long delay
times and a high probability for packet loss (Fall, 2003). Nodes can be highly mobile, with
dynamic connections to neighbouring nodes within communications range. These character-
istics produce a network that is dynamic and highly fragmented, with message transfer taking
the form of a store-carry and forward scheme as presented in Guo et al. (2010). Exchanging of
session keys similar to a Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) scheme
in a DTN would result in long delays. Therefore, schemes like SSL/TLS are infeasible in
such environments.
An example scenario is of a vehicular network in a dense urban city. Smart vehicles with
individual sensors can report on telemetry such as local weather conditions, traffic status
and also act as data mules between remote towns. These vehicles then communicate through
wireless radio to other vehicles in the vicinity to share data and transfer messages. As vehicles
drive in and out of town they act as data mules for developing towns and villages with limited
connectivity. Due to the large geographical area such a network may cover, it is unreasonable
to assume that PKI is available to establish an initial secure context between the vehicles.
Therefore the security of key management in a DTN is still an open problem.
Key distribution is important in both WSN and DTN networks as they provide the
mechanism to establish a confidential channel between nodes. Different key distribution
schemes such as Perrig et al. (2002) and Basagni et al. (2001), help establish secure channels
between nodes. Key distribution provides a hard security mechanism, that provides all or no
access (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997). In comparison, soft security models (Rasmusson
et al., 1996) such as trust systems and trust management look at a social control model
(Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997). The trust between two or more entities can allow nodes
in a DTN to distinguish between compromised malicious nodes and uncompromised nodes.
This paper extends the key distribution scheme proposed by Jia et al. (2012). The
contributions of this paper is the use of a trust system to assist the key distribution scheme of
Jia et al. (2012) for autonomous nodes. It focuses on the initial secure context of nodes being
deployed in a new environment, in particular how to distribute keys without a centralised PKI
party involved as in Wu et al. (2007). The distributed model is more robust and resilient
in comparison to a centralised trust model, which can present a single point of failure in
the network. In a distributed model, each node is responsible for its own security and the
security of the entire network. This architecture eliminates a common point of failure in
the trusted third party such as a CA. This paper also contributes by comparing trust and
reputations systems during the bootstrapping process (The initial key sharing period of a
DTN). Past implementations of reputation systems such as EigenTrust (Kamvar et al., 2003)
and PeerTrust (Xiong and Liu, 2004) rely on previous history of actions to determine the
reputation of a node. However in the bootstrapping process, there is no history of actions to
provide a trustworthy rating for each node. Jia et al. (2012) used a model that assigned a
random trust value to each node upon first encounter. This paper assists the proposal of Jia
et al. (2012) by utilising a trust system, which leverages common contacts. It is also shown
that assigning a random trust value provides very little security against the introduction
of a malicious node. The authors of this paper evaluate the addition of a trust system
by measuring two properties. The first being how the trust system affects key distribution
efficiency, or the speed at which keys are distributed. The second being what additional
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security does the trust system provide to the key distribution scheme. This is achieved by
introducing malicious nodes.
In section 2 we will outline the related works examining DTN, and the security challenges
that are still present, public key cryptography and how it is relevant to distributed and
unmanaged DTN. We also discuss in detail the work conducted by Jia et al. (2012). An
overview of trust and reputation systems, and how these systems are either centrally managed
(like a PKI or CA) or distributed as in the case of a Web of Trust (Zimmermann, 1995).
Section 3 will outline a new initial trust system that leverages common friends. Section 4
outlines the simulation and methodology, along with the parameters used in the experiments.
It will describe the simulation engine constructed, and the introduction of a malicious node
to see the resilience and performance of such a network when under attack. Section 5 and
6 presents the results and discussion of the various experiments. Section 7 concludes on the
results and proposes future work that has yet to be undertaken.
2. Related Work
DTN characteristics such as long delay paths, frequent disconnections and mobility (Fall,
2003; Galati, 2010), have seen traditional Internet security methods rendered impractical.
Techniques such as SSL/TLS become impractical when frequent communication disruptions
hinder session key establishment. Along with examples of practical applications of DTN
taking the form of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETS) (Fall, 2003; Lin et al., 2008; Zhu
et al., 2009b), and interplanetary networks (Fall, 2003; Burleigh et al., 2003), it has become
important to provide security in these vulnerable networks.
Many DTN security schemes have been proposed as follows. Secure routing for messages
between intermediate nodes was presented in Wood et al. (2009), Guo et al. (2010) and
Hui et al. (2011), with a more specific application to VANETS in Lu et al. (2010). Lu
et al. (2010) also exploited social contacts for message forwarding and was able to achieve
privacy preservation. By exploiting social contacts, Defrawy et al. (2009) also proposes a
solution to the initial secure context establishment. With the assumption that no reliable
PKI is available, Defrawy et al. (2009) leverages social contacts to match a node to a more
prominent entity such as a university or library where nodes can then receive public keys.
They also outline how to provide confidentiality and authentication for messages transferred
through their scheme. Hui et al. (2011) also proposed a social based forwarding scheme called
BUBBLE, while a credit based incentive for nodes to transfer messages was presented in Zhu
et al. (2009a).
DTN networks without a centralised PKI (Seth and Keshav, 2005) have employed identity
based cryptography. This is when source nodes generate encryption that is tied to the
destination node from associated information such a public library or university. Proposals
such as Seth and Keshav (2005), Kate et al. (2007), and Patra et al. (2008) have utilised
identity based cryptography to provide security in a DTN. However the disadvantages of
employing an identity based cryptography scheme presents difficulty in revoking private keys,
and introducing key escrow. An analysis into the applicability of identity based cryptography
in DTN systems by Asokan et al. (2007) found that for authentication it had no significant
advantage over traditional cryptography. Because of this, we utilise traditional cryptography
for our distributed DTN system.
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The use of threshold cryptography based on the threshold scheme by Shamir (1979)
was outlined by Omar et al. (2009). The authors investigated a distributed security for
MANETS. Employing a similar trust propagation model as PGP (Abdul-Rahman, 1997),
individual nodes generate, store, sign and distribute their own certificates similar to Capkun
et al. (2003). The performance and effectiveness of the scheme proposed by Omar et al. (2009)
was measured by introducing internal malicious nodes to falsify certificates and determine
the rate of successful certification. We use a similar methodology to Omar et al. (2009) in
measuring the performance and effectiveness of our proposed scheme.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a framework to provide data encryption, and authenti-
cation which was created by Phil Zimmermann in 1991. It encompasses several security
technologies including hybrid key cryptography, the utilisation of both symmetric and asym-
metric cryptography for performance, and a Web of Trust model of trust (Zimmermann,
1995). The Web of Trust is a decentralised trust model of public keys, where the generated
keys are associated with the identity of the user, and is digitally signed by others in the web
as an endorsement that the key corresponds to the user. The system is very flexible and can
utilise various degrees of trust. Keys can be assigned a trust value from the set of:
1. Not applicable
2. Do NOT Trust
3. Trust Marginally
4. Fully Trust
5. Ultimate Trust
These trust settings require human intervention to define how each individual differen-
tiates between the categories such as Trust Marginally to Fully Trust. Rules can be set to
allow any number of partially trusted key endorsers be required to trust a key. The necessity
for humans to establish trust for PGP becomes infeasible for autonomous systems such as
VANETS. The distributed key model of PGP require users to be responsible for the man-
agement of the keys they own and receive from other users. In contrast to the public keys of
PGP, X.509 certificates allows each certificate to be signed only by a CA, in a hierarchical
based structure. The CA model delegates the responsibility of trust to the centralised CA
and is widely used for SSL/TLS Internet communications. However this architecture of trust
is difficult for use in a DTN due to frequent fragmentation of the network.
2.1. Jia et al. (2012)
Jia et al. (2012) outlined that sharing keying material in a DTN where PKI is unavailable
is still an open problem. The authors proposed the use of a similar key distribution to PGP
with varying levels of trust and utilising two channel cryptography techniques to prevent
spoofing of keys during key transfer. Nodes generate their own public/private key pair
similar to Rivest et al. (1978) and move in close geographical proximity to each other. Each
node exchanges public keys with one another, and stores, carries and forwards public keys.
The key distribution is implemented through two channel cryptography. Node A and B are
connected and want to exchange public keys. Node A selects a random key x and computes
s, a hash of the public key keyed with x s = Hx(PubKey A). It then sends over a wireless
channel to Node B the Public Key of A, and the random key x. It also sends over the second
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channel s. Node B receives the packages over both channels and computes its own version of
s (s’ ) from the Public Key of A and the random key x. If s’ is equal to s, the message was
authentic.
The public keys of each node are exchanged by meeting other nodes, forming the highest
trust level, direct trust. Keys in the direct key list are easily verifiable as they were received
from the node that owns the public key. As nodes are highly mobile, they receive the public
keys of various other nodes, becoming carriers. These carried keys, belonging to other nodes
are also distributed forming indirect trust relationships between nodes. This follows the Web
of Trust principle: If Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Carol, then Alice can indirectly trust
Carol.
An example of this scenario is when Alice meets Bob, they both exchange the keys they
own. Alice has Bob’s public key in her direct keys list, and Bob now has Alice’s public key in
his direct key list. Some time later, Alice meets Carol and exchange public keys. Carol now
has Alice’s public key in her direct key list. Alice has two public keys in her direct key list,
the keys of Bob and Carol. Since Alice has met Bob and exchanged keys, she now carries
Bob’s key and passes it onto Carol.
Because the ownership of carried keys cannot be easily verified in a distributed system
in comparison to a centralised architecture, Jia et al. (2012) proposed the use of an approval
system. The receiving node may approve or reject the carried key based on the trust value
of the carrier node it received the key from. For example, Bob may have received many
instances of Carol’s key from various other carriers. Bob trusts these carriers with varying
degrees of trust. Bob assigns a trust value to each carrier and if the total trust of all carriers
is above a threshold, Bob approves Carol’s key into the approved key list. Since human
reasoning is required to provide the initial trust value of each carrier, the simulation carried
out by Jia et al. (2012) utilised randomly generated trust values.
Jia et al. (2012) simulate their key distribution scheme using randomly generated values
of initial trust in the NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) simulator. Jia et al. (2012) utilises the spread
of carrier keys to effectively distribute keys in large scale DTN systems upon deployment.
However, the scheme is heavily dependant on either human intervention or a centralised
management, since establishing initial trust between autonomous nodes is difficult. The
authors of this paper are interested in utilising a distributed key management scheme for
autonomous DTN nodes.
3. The New Trust System - Leverage of Common Friends
In a DTN such as Jia et al. (2012), nodes move around and can freely connect to other
nodes within communications range to exchange and distribute keys. Using the same three
tiered trust scheme as Jia et al. (2012) nodes can carry keys in three lists. The first is the
direct key list, which is a list of keys that the node has personally met and exchanged public
keys. The second is the approved key list, a list of keys that a sufficient number of friends of
the node has met. This represents the list of nodes who most likely exist but have not yet
been met. The third is the untrusted key list, a list of keys considered untrustworthy as they
are below the trust threshold for approval.
Figure 1 depicts the public key exchange of two nodes when connected using no trust
system. This scenario is the control scenario of the simulations. Upon connection, both
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nodes flag a connected status and stop moving. In the direct key exchange phase of Figure 1,
Node A sends its public key to Node B, and Node B reciprocates by also sending its public
key. Each node then adds the directly received public key to their direct key list. The next
phase is the carrier key exchange as shown in Figure 1. This is when Node A sends the list of
nodes it has met in the past, essentially a record of the direct key list. Node B also sends its
respective list of nodes. Each node scans the list and finds nodes that are not in the direct
or approved key list and adds them to the approved key list. The final phase in the public
key exchange process is the disconnection from each other and resuming movement.
Figure 1: Public key exchange with no reputation system.
The second method is the one outlined in Jia et al. (2012) where nodes randomly generate
an initial trust value. This leads to an asymmetric trust relationship between the two nodes.
Figure 2 depicts the public key exchange with random trust assignment from Jia et al. (2012).
It shows that two additional steps in the public key exchange are required, the first is after
the connection stage, both nodes independently randomly generate a trust value for each
other. The carrier key exchange process now includes an approval process utilised by Jia
et al. (2012), where trust of carrier nodes is accumulated, and if above the threshold, the
carried key is approved.
3.1. Leverage of Common Friends Trust System
We build upon the work of Jia et al. (2012) by proposing a distributed trust system to help
establish initial trust between nodes. We also introduce a single malicious node to measure
the effectiveness and importance of establishing initial trust during the key distribution phase.
Papers such as Farrell and Cahill (2006), and Jia et al. (2012), have shown that estab-
lishing the initial secure context at deployment is still an open security problem. Trust and
reputation systems such as PageRank (Page et al., 1999) and other credit based systems are
managed by a central entity. In a distributed DTN, establishing initial secure context is
further hindered by the fact that nodes must manage their own keys and trust relationship
with other nodes.
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Figure 2: Public key exchange with random trust assignment.
The use of a trust and reputation system to establish the initial trust between two nodes
meeting for the first time requires some sort of past history. Reputation systems proposed
by Xiong and Liu (2004), and Kamvar et al. (2003), measure the effectiveness and efficiency
of nodes when given certain tasks to complete. However in the instance of establishing initial
trust when multiple nodes meet for the first time, a past history of task completion does not
yet exist.
We propose a new linear simple reputation system called Leverage of Common Friends
(LCF), to help establish the initial trust for secure autonomous communications. For the
purposes of this paper the authors of this paper use a linear relationship between trust and
number of nodes met. Other relationships such as exponential and logarithmic can be used
depending on the application of the DTN. Some applications may require the speed of key
distribution over time to be as fast as possible, thus following a logarithmic relationship.
Other applications may require a more slow and steady key distribution over time, thus
utilising an exponential relationship. The authors of this paper use a linear relationship
as it allows a moderate distribution of keys that is faster than an exponential relationship,
and more steady than a logarithmic relationship. The proposed reputation system leverages
common contacts between the two nodes which are meeting for the first time. As seen in Jia
et al. (2012) nodes meet and exchange keys similar to the PGP model. Nodes build a web of
trust similar to Zimmermann (1995) as they move around in the community. Over this time
period, it is assumed that the more nodes (or in a social context ”friends”) that the node has
met, it is more trustworthy and well established in the community. Although the absolute
number of nodes met is important, the number of nodes shared in common provides a more
substantial metric for establishing initial trust. This mitigates the effect of a malicious node
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fabricating a large list of friends to falsify a higher trust rating.
The two properties, number of nodes met (N) and number of common nodes (C), both
increase the trust value. Decreasing trust value (D) is achieved during the comparison of
common nodes. Key signatures, are compared of the common nodes for any discrepancies.
If there is a discrepancy, both nodes will decrease trust value with respect to each other.
Nodes will take the default stance of completely trusting themselves, and assume their key
instance as the correct key, whilst the neighbouring node has a false key. We assume that
trust is diminished significantly faster than increasing trust.
The linear relationship between common contacts and acquaintances, and trust can be
represented by the equation below:
The trust of Node A with respect to Node B T(A,B) is given by:
T (A,B) = tneutral + (tn ∗N) + (tc ∗ C) − (td ∗D) (1)
Where:
tn is the trust weighting given to number of contacts.
N is the number of nodes A has met.
tc is the trust weighting given to the common contacts of Node A and Node B.
C is the number of nodes in common with A and B.
td is the distrust weighting upon discovering a potential false key.
D is the number of discrepancy keys between A and B.
tneutral is the starting value of trust.
Figure 3 depicts the public key exchange using the LCF trust system. Building on Jia et al.
(2012), Figure 3 shows the establishing initial trust stage is more comprehensive, requiring
both nodes to send a list of direct contacts to each other. Trust is then computed based on
these lists and the usual direct and carrier key exchange is carried out before disconnecting.
This reputation system is scalable and allows the introduction of new nodes into the
community in the future. New nodes introduced will initially have a low trust rating, but as
they meet and interact with established nodes, their trust rating will increase.
4. Simulation and Methodology
The authors of this paper have produced a DTN simulator in MATLAB. This simulator
models the distribution of keys between nodes in a DTN using the web of trust methodology
similar to Jia et al. (2012). Random movement models for a predefined number of nodes
and size of simulation space was generated. This movement model was recorded and re-used
for each run of experiment to provide a controlled movement and node connection model.
Nodes were initialised with a random starting XY co-ordinate, node ID and a randomly
generated key signature. The simulation space is divided into squares. For each node at
each time step, the simulator rolls a 9 sided die to determine whether the node should move
into the eight adjacent squares or stay in the current square. This random model was used
initially and additional movement models can be employed to provide more realistic DTN
nodal movement. Nodes within a predefined communications range of another node may
then connect to each other to engage in key exchange.
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Figure 3: Public key exchange with LCF trust assignment.
Two properties that affect the trust system on the key distribution scheme are measured.
The first is the key distribution efficiency or speed at which keys are distributed. This is
measured by comparing the proposed leverage common friends trust system to the random
trust system used in Jia et al. (2012), and the control, where there is no trust system. The
second is whether the trust system can provide any additional security to the key distribution
scheme. This is measured by introducing a malicious node into the system and measuring
which nodes accept malicious keys.
4.1. Experiments
Three scenarios, each using the different methods of establishing initial trust formed an
experiment. The first called control, utilised a complete trust method. The second called
random, utilised a random trust similar to Jia et al. (2012). The third called common, utilised
the new LCF method. For each experiment a random movement model was generated and
replayed for all three scenarios, this allowed the same movement and connections to nodes to
be replayed for each different method of establishing initial trust. It permitted the observation
of how each methodology of establishing initial trust changed the rate of key distribution.
Each scenario was played out for a total of 10000 clock steps (τ) with 100 nodes randomly
assigned in a 100x100 square grid. A clock step represents a second. For each clock step,
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the nodes could travel a distance of 1 grid space and had a communications range of 1 grid
space. When detecting a neighbouring node, it would engage in key exchange for a total of 60
seconds to simulate sufficient time to handshake, exchange keys using various key exchange
protocols and transfer additional data such as messages. Jia et al. (2012) assumes a time
of 120 seconds to be sufficient time to exchange keys between nodes. During this period,
the two nodes would generate an initial trust value from one of the three methods, exchange
their own keys, exchange keys in the direct keys list with each other that would become
approved keys provided they met the trust threshold. Upon completion of exchanging keys,
nodes would disconnect and resume movement.
The simulation has the ability to introduce a malicious node into the system. This is
an insider attack model. The malicious node is assumed to have similar abilities as outlined
in Dolev and Yao (1983). The malicious node can obtain any message passing through the
network, they are a user of the network and can therefore initiate communications with
other nodes in the network, and they are also a receiver of communications. A node can
be designated as a sleeper malicious node and turn bad at a given time stamp during the
simulation designated as τm. The node and time stamp can be defined by the user. When
τ < τm, the sleeper node behaves normally and interacts with other nodes, participating in
the exchanging and distribution of keys, as shown in Figure 4a. However at τ = τm shown
in Figure 4b, the node flags an internal switch designating itself as malicious, regenerates a
new malicious private/public key pair and replaces all the public keys of nodes in the direct
and approved list as its own key. It then proceeds to distribute its own malicious key and
other false keys to nodes it meets at τ > τm as seen in Figures 4c and 4d. In Figure 4c, The
malicious node replaces the legitimate keys it has received with the malicious key. The other
node receives instances of the malicious key, in two forms, first the malicious key attached to
the malicious node identity, and the second being the malicious key attached to a legitimate
node identity. This simulates the scenario of a malicious outsider compromising a member
of the community. The spread of false keys is detrimental to the security of the network.
Nodes may pass messages using falsified keys of the unsuspecting receiver. These false keys
then allow the malicious node to eavesdrop on network traffic and impersonate other nodes.
A malicious node was introduced into the simulation at τ = 200. This value was chosen
to reflect the scenario where an attacker compromises a node shortly after deployment. Node
100 was designated as the malicious node and at 200 clock steps would change all the keys
in the direct and approved list to the malicious key 0xBAD (101110101101). The malicious
node would then continue to spread these malicious keys and upon meeting another node,
transfer the malicious key, accept the neighbouring nodes key and proceed to change it to
0xBAD. This is essentially a key spoof attack. The introduction of the malicious node is a
simulated event of an attacker compromising a node of the system.
Table 1 provides a summary of the simulation parameters. For the random and common
scenarios, the trust threshold for approved keys was set at a value of 1.1. The random scenario
generated a trust value between 0 and 1, as to ensure a carried key had to be received by a
minimum of two nodes to allow approval. The common scenario parameters were set with
the initial starting value (tneutral) at 0.5 to reflect a neutral trust value. The constant tn
reflecting the weighting given for number of contacts is set to 0.01. This was set by the
authors of this paper to reflect that a 0.1 point increase in trust should occur for every 10
friends that the node has. The weighting for tc, was set at 0.025 to reflect that for generating
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Figure 4: Malicious node falsifying keys.
trust, common friends are more important than the quantity of friends. The constant was
set to reflect a 0.25 point increase in trust for every 10 common friends. In setting a value for
both tn and tc, 10 friends represented 10 percent of the node population in the simulation.
The distrust weighting (td) for having a false key in possession was heavily weighted at 0.25
to reflect that it is easier for a node to distrust than to trust.
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Figure 5: Placement of nodes in simulation space and number of keys for each node.
Table 1 - Simulation Parameters
No. of Time Steps (τ) 10000
Simulation Area 100 x 100 squares
No. of Nodes 100
Communications Range of nodes 1 square
Key Exchange Time 60 time steps
Movement Model Random
Trust Threshold 1.1
Initial Trust Range 0 to 1.0
tneutral 0.5
tn 0.01
tc 0.025
td 0.25
Malicious Node Node 100
Malicious Node Introduction (τm) τ = 200
Malicious Node Key 101110101101
In total, six experiments were run, each with three scenarios. Due to the random nature of
the random scenario, this scenario was run three times for each experiment, and an average
was taken. Figure 5 depicts the placement of the nodes in the simulation space. The X
and Y axis depicting the XY co-ordinate position of the nodes, and the Z-axis depicting the
number of keys in the direct and approved list. It shows a uniformly distributed placement
and movement of nodes in the simulation. However due to the randomness of initial node
placement, this may not always occur.
5. Results
Key distribution was an important metric to measure, allowing the observation of how
efficient keys were distributed amongst nodes of the DTN. Figure 6 depicts the average key
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Figure 6: Direct and Approved key distribution over time for the different trust systems.
distribution for each scenario over time.
For each of the experiments involving malicious nodes, three metrics were used to de-
termine the effectiveness and behaviour of the reputation system. The first looked at the
number of keys the malicious node was able to obtain from both the direct and approved key
lists. Since the same movement pattern was replayed for all three scenarios, resulting in the
same node meetings occurring, the direct key list would be identical for the control, random
and common scenarios. However the approved key list would differ due to differing trust
systems between the scenarios. The second metric is the number of other nodes that have
received the key of the malicious node (KeyID: Node 100, Key: 101110101101) in either their
direct or approved list. Again since the movement model is the same for all three scenarios, it
was expected that the direct key list would be identical between the scenarios. However the
approved key list would differ based on the reputation system. The third metric measures the
number of falsified keys. That is keys that have a non malicious owner but have a malicious
key entry from the malicious node (KeyID: Node 75, Key: 101110101101). These keys pose
the larger threat to secure communications in the DTN as it allows the malicious node to
eavesdrop on messages as they are routed through a store-carry and forward scheme (Guo
et al., 2010). Table 2 shows the penetration of the malicious key in the system for a typical
experiment, and Table 3 depicts the averaged results for all six experiments. The summation
of these three metrics can be measured over time. Figure 7 depicts the average of all six
experiments to show the distribution of malicious keys over time.
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Figure 7: Malicious key distribution over time for the different trust systems.
Table 2 - Typical Experiment Result
Rand.
Cont. 1 2 3 Comm.
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 42 42 42 42 42
App. 58 58 58 58 3
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 40 40 40 40 40
App. 50 51 54 50 53
Falsified Keys App. 30 16 25 29 2
Totals
Dir. 82 82 82 82 82
App. 138 125 137 137 58
All 220 207 219 219 140
Table 3 - Averaged Experimental Results
Control Random Common
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 46.33 46.33 46.33
App. 53.67 53.33 3.83
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 43.67 43.67 43.67
App. 44 47.78 48.17
Falsified Keys App. 50.67 53.22 6
Totals
Dir. 90 90 90
App. 148.33 154.33 58
All 238.33 244.33 148
6. Discussion
Results from the experiments focused on the efficiency of key distribution, and the number
of malicious keys distributed for each scenario.
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6.1. Key Distribution Efficiency
Figure 6 depicts the key distribution of both direct and approved keys for each scenario.
It shows that the control scenario provides the fastest key distribution with after 10000 time
steps each node averaging 100 keys. This indicates that each node has either met or is
aware through other nodes all other 99 nodes in the simulation and can communicate with
them. The random and common scenarios show a slower but still effective key distribution.
It is interesting to note that the random scenario was slower than the common scenario.
This is due to that fact that the LCF, resulted in a more relevant initial trust value and a
trustworthy distribution of keys in comparison to a randomly generated trust value in the
random scenario. This is evident when analysing the time taken for each scenario to distribute
50% of the keys. The control scenario distributed 50% of the keys after approximately 2500
time steps, the fastest of all three scenarios. The common scenario distributed the same
amount of keys after approximately 3600 time steps, whilst the random scenario took the
longest requiring approximately 4200 seconds to distribute 50% of the keys.
When compared to Jia et al. (2012), the random scenarios indicate that our results dis-
tribute more keys after the same number of time steps. This is likely because of differing
simulation engines. Jia et al. (2012) utilise the NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) simulator, whilst
the authors of this paper have produced a fully customisable DTN simulator in MATLAB.
Movement models although both are considered random, is not defined by Jia et al. (2012) as
whether it is random or random waypoint (Johnson and Maltz, 1996), where nodes randomly
generate a destination, path and speed. In this experiment, the direction was randomly gen-
erated, but the speed was kept at a constant 1 grid space per clock step.
6.2. Malicious Key Distribution
Table 2 shows that using the random method to establish initial trust, provides little
or no additional security compared to the control scenario, for the prevention of malicious
keys being distributed. Some experiments (see appendix) show that more malicious keys are
approved for the random scenario at the end of the simulation than the control scenario.
Because the malicious node is introduced after 200 time steps, the sleeper malicious node
has the ability to distribute a set of un-compromised keys before turning bad. In the control
scenario, these keys are spread quickly as there is no reputation system for accepting carried
keys. As a result, once the malicious node is activated and distributing the malicious key,
there are two different keys associated with the malicious node. One key belonging to the
node before it went bad, and one after. The good key displaced some of the nodes that may
receive the bad key later on. Since these nodes already have a key instance of the malicious
node, it does not require another instance and rejects the malicious key.
The first metric is the number of keys that the malicious node was able to obtain and
falsify, or bad node with bad keys (Tables 2 and 3). Both the control and random scenarios
showed similar results as seen from the averaged results in Table 3. For the number of
approved keys, both the random and control scenarios had on average 53.67 and 53.33 keys
respectively. However, looking at the approved key list for the random scenario, it uncovered
that many keys were approved later in the simulation as trust values were aggregated from
various sources. Therefore as the simulation progressed, it became easier to approve carried
keys. However, for the common scenario, nearly all experiments showed poor results in
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obtaining carried keys from sources averaging 3.83 keys in Table 3. This can be explained
through the design of the reputation system employed.
During the process of examining common contacts, the node will check the neighbouring
nodes direct list of nodes and key signatures. If they are identical, the trust value is incre-
mented, however if the key signatures of the node is different, the trust value is decreased
significantly. This is designed to establish a low initial trust value for nodes that carry false
keys. Due to the lack of a centralised key manager or reputation system, the only method
of checking whether the node is carrying false keys is to compare key signatures of nodes
in common to both nodes. Since the node assumes that itself is a trustworthy source, if
there is a discrepancy in the signature, it will assume the other node is carrying a false key.
The malicious node carries multiple faked keys that itself regards as correct and fully trust-
worthy. Therefore if it meets another node with genuinely correct keys, it will assume that
the other node is spreading false keys and degrade the trust rating. With the introduction
of multiple malicious nodes, it is expected to segregate the network into the two groups of
un-compromised and malicious nodes.
The second metric is the number of nodes that have approved the malicious key, or good
nodes with bad keys (Tables 2 and 3). The results indicate that both the random and
common scenarios provide little security in preventing this. Table 3 shows an average of the
six experiments that the control scenario having 44 malicious keys distributed as a reference.
The random and common scenarios distributed slightly more malicious keys averaging 47.78
and 48.17 respectively. In particular for the common scenario, the malicious key is spread
by un-compromised nodes that have directly met the malicious node, taken on the malicious
key in their direct list, and then spread them to other un-compromised nodes through the
approval process. Since the common scenario is designed to establish a more appropriate
initial trust value, the malicious key is still spread slightly better than both the control and
random scenarios. Practically, this is an acceptable result as it allows the malicious key,
owned by the malicious node, to be disseminated through the network. In the future, if the
network allows distributed revocation, each node can flag the malicious node as compromised
and handle the key accordingly.
6.3. False Key Distribution
The third metric looks at the number of false keys that the malicious node has distributed.
These keys have the Node ID belonging to a un-compromised node, however the key itself
is the malicious key. From the experiments, it is evident that only the common reputation
system successfully mitigates the distribution of false keys, averaging 6 falsified keys as shown
in Table 3. This is effective as the system segregates the network into un-compromised and
malicious nodes. The random scenarios show little to no effect on mitigating the spread of
false keys, and in some experiments, performed worse than the control scenario. The random
scenarios averaged 53.22 falsified keys which was higher than the control scenario of 50.67
falsified keys. The mitigation of distribution of false keys by a malicious node is imperative
to provide secure communications in such a network. Distribution of false keys allow the
malicious node to eavesdrop on communications and allow the impersonation of the victim
node. The results show that the malicious node is segregated through trust by other un-
compromised nodes in the common scenario, with a low acceptance of falsified keys. Further
improvements to the LCF trust system can come in the form of allowing the trust value of
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each node to be modified upon meeting again, or a decaying trust value as time increases. The
malicious key distribution over time in Figure 7 shows that the common scenario mitigates
a significant amount of malicious keys introduced by one compromised node.
The total malicious key distribution over time depicted in Figure 7, shows that the com-
mon scenario distributed 40% less malicious keys at the end of the simulation than the control
and random scenarios. It also shows that the distribution of malicious keys flattens out after
7000 to 8000 time steps. Variations in the results are evident in the random scenarios for
each experiment. Although the movement model was replayed for each scenario, the initial
trust value when two nodes meet in the random scenario was randomly generated. Replay-
ing each simulation would result in variations of approved key lists due to the random trust
value. This coupled with the introduction of the malicious node after 200 time steps caused
variations between experiments as to the spread of un-compromised keys of the malicious
node before 200 time steps. However this was necessary to reflect a node being compromised
after deployment.
7. Conclusion
This paper utilised the introduction of a single malicious node into a DTN to measure the
effectiveness of different trust systems. Using a key distribution scheme similar to Jia et al.
(2012), which is based on the Web of Trust principle (Zimmermann, 1995), for areas with no
centralised PKI or trust system is an effective mechanism of distributing keys. It also shows
that the implementation of an autonomous system that establishes the initial trust between
the nodes presents security challenges normally managed by the centralised third party.
Three implementations of a trust system were simulated to determine their effectiveness
at mitigating the distribution of a malicious key introduced by a compromised node. The
control scenario of having no trust system to distribute carried keys provided a base metric on
measuring the effectiveness of a reputation system. The second implementation similar to Jia
et al. (2012), used a randomly generated value when two nodes come within communications
range. This implementation was not successful in preventing the distribution of the malicious
key. The third implementation was the LCF trust system amongst the two nodes. Initial
trust was established based on the number of contacts, number of contacts in common and
the validity of the keys. This implementation provided a more useful trust value for nodes
with no prior history without a centralised reputation manager. This implementation also
provided an effective mitigation in malicious key distribution, particular in the distribution
of faked keys.
The results indicate that in autonomous DTN systems, implementation of a distributed
trust system based on common contacts improved key distribution in comparison to the
control or random scenarios. This trust system also contributed to mitigating the distribution
of false and malicious keys between nodes by 40% at the end of the simulation. In particular
the number of falsified keys was significantly reduced from an average of 50.67 keys in the
control scenario to 6 keys in the common scenario.
Improvements and future work include looking at the introduction of multiple malicious
nodes to the network. This will help examine the effectiveness of repelling a multiple malicious
nodal attack. The introduction of different reputation systems is also to be considered.
The ability for the reputation system to provide distributed and automated (unmanaged)
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revocation requires further investigation. Improvements in the random movement model to
incorporate a random way-point model (Johnson and Maltz, 1996) is also an area requiring
further investigation.
References
Abdul-Rahman, A.. The pgp trust model. In: J Electron Commer. 1997. .
Abdul-Rahman, A., Hailes, S.. A distributed trust model. In: Proceedings of the 1997
workshop on New security paradigms. New York, NY, USA: ACM; NSPW ’97; 1997. p.
48–60.
Asokan, N., Kostiainen, K., Ginzboorg, P., Ott, J., Luo, C.. Applicability of identity-based
cryptography for disruption-tolerant networking. In: Proceedings of the 1st international
MobiSys workshop on Mobile opportunistic networking. New York, NY, USA: ACM; Mo-
biOpp ’07; 2007. p. 52–56.
Basagni, S., Herrin, K., Bruschi, D., Rosti, E.. Secure pebblenets. In: Proceedings of the
2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking &amp; computing. New
York, NY, USA: ACM; MobiHoc ’01; 2001. p. 156–163.
Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L., Fall, K., Cerf, V., Durst, B., Scott, K., Weiss,
H.. Delay-tolerant networking: an approach to interplanetary internet. Communications
Magazine, IEEE 2003;41(6):128 – 136.
Capkun, S., Buttyan, L., Hubaux, J.P.. Self-organized public-key management for mobile
ad hoc networks. Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on 2003;2(1):52 – 64.
Defrawy, K.E., Solis, J., Tsudik, G.. Leveraging social contacts for message confidentiality
in delay tolerant networks. In: Proceedings of the 2009 33rd Annual IEEE International
Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01. Washington, DC, USA:
IEEE Computer Society; 2009. p. 271–279.
Dolev, D., Yao, A.. On the security of public key protocols. Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on 1983;29(2):198 – 208.
Fall, K.. A delay-tolerant network architecture for challenged internets. In: Proceedings of
the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for com-
puter communications. New York, NY, USA: ACM; SIGCOMM ’03; 2003. p. 27–34.
Farrell, S., Cahill, V.. Security considerations in space and delay tolerant networks. In:
Space Mission Challenges for Information Technology, 2006. SMC-IT 2006. Second IEEE
International Conference on. 2006. p. 8 pp. –38.
Galati, A.. Delay Tolerant Network. Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010.
Guo, H., Li, J., Qian, Y.. Hop-dtn: Modeling and evaluation of homing-pigeon-based delay-
tolerant networks. Vehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on 2010;59(2):857 –868.
18
Hui, P., Crowcroft, J., Yoneki, E.. Bubble rap: Social-based forwarding in delay-tolerant
networks. Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on 2011;10(11):1576 –1589.
Jia, Z., Lin, X., Tan, S.H., Li, L., Yang, Y.. Public key distribution scheme for delay
tolerant networks based on two-channel cryptography. Journal of Network and Computer
Applications 2012;35(3):905 – 913. Special Issue on Trusted Computing and Communica-
tions.
Johnson, D.B., Maltz, D.A.. Dynamic source routing in ad hoc wireless networks. Forbes
1996;353(2):153181.
Kamvar, S.D., Schlosser, M.T., Garcia-Molina, H.. The eigentrust algorithm for reputation
management in p2p networks. In: Proceedings of the 12th international conference on
World Wide Web. New York, NY, USA: ACM; WWW ’03; 2003. p. 640–651.
Kate, A., Zaverucha, G.M., Hengartner, U.. Anonymity and security in delay tolerant
networks. In: Security and Privacy in Communications Networks and the Workshops,
2007. SecureComm 2007. Third International Conference on. 2007. p. 504 –513.
Lin, X., Lu, R., Zhang, C., Zhu, H., Ho, P.H., Shen, X.. Security in vehicular ad hoc
networks. Communications Magazine, IEEE 2008;46(4):88 –95.
Lu, R., Lin, X., Shen, X.. Spring: A social-based privacy-preserving packet forwarding
protocol for vehicular delay tolerant networks. In: INFOCOM, 2010 Proceedings IEEE.
2010. p. 1 –9.
Omar, M., Challal, Y., Bouabdallah, A.. Reliable and fully distributed trust model for
mobile ad hoc networks. Computers &amp; Security 2009;28(3-4):199 – 214.
Page, L., Brin, S., Motwani, R., Winograd, T.. The pagerank citation ranking: Bringing
order to the web. 1999.
Patra, R., Surana, S., Nedevschi, S.. Hierarchical identity based cryptography for end-
to-end security in dtns. In: Intelligent Computer Communication and Processing, 2008.
ICCP 2008. 4th International Conference on. 2008. p. 223 –230.
Perrig, A., Szewczyk, R., Tygar, J.D., Wen, V., Culler, D.E.. Spins: security protocols
for sensor networks. Wirel Netw 2002;8:521–534.
Rasmusson, L., Rasmusson, A., Janson, S.. Reactive security and social control. In:
Proceedings, 19 National Information System Security Conference. Swedish Institute of
Computer Science; Untrusted Code; 1996. p. –.
Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., Adleman, L.. A method for obtaining digital signatures and
public-key cryptosystems. Commun ACM 1978;21:120–126.
Seth, A., Keshav, S.. Practical security for disconnected nodes. In: Secure Network
Protocols, 2005. (NPSec). 1st IEEE ICNP Workshop on. 2005. p. 31 – 36.
Shamir, A.. How to share a secret. Commun ACM 1979;22:612–613.
19
Wilensky, U.. Netlogo. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-based Modeling,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL; 1999. .
Wood, L., Eddy, W., Holliday, P.. A bundle of problems. In: Aerospace conference, 2009
IEEE. 2009. p. 1 –17.
Wu, B., Wu, J., Fernandez, E.B., Ilyas, M., Magliveras, S.. Secure and efficient key
management in mobile ad hoc networks. Journal of Network and Computer Applications
2007;30(3):937 – 954.
Xiong, L., Liu, L.. Peertrust: supporting reputation-based trust for peer-to-peer electronic
communities. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on 2004;16(7):843 –
857.
Zhu, H., Lin, X., Lu, R., Fan, Y., Shen, X.. Smart: A secure multilayer credit-based
incentive scheme for delay-tolerant networks. Vehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on
2009a;58(8):4628 –4639.
Zhu, H., Lu, R., Shen, X., Lin, X.. Security in service-oriented vehicular networks. Wireless
Communications, IEEE 2009b;16(4):16 –22.
Zimmermann, P.R.. The official PGP user’s guide. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 1995.
20
Appendix A
Experiment 1 Results
Random
Control 1 2 3 Common
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 42 42 42 42 42
App. 58 58 58 58 3
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 40 40 40 40 40
App. 50 51 54 50 53
Falsified Keys App. 30 16 25 29 2
Totals
Dir. 82 82 82 82 82
App. 138 125 137 137 58
All 220 207 219 219 140
Experiment 2 Results
Random
Control 1 2 3 Common
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 48 48 48 48 48
App. 52 52 52 52 0
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 44 44 44 44 44
App. 32 47 41 43 39
Falsified Keys App. 60 59 53 44 8
Totals
Dir. 92 92 92 92 92
App. 144 158 146 139 47
All 236 250 238 231 139
Experiment 3 Results
Random
Control 1 2 3 Common
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 53 53 53 53 53
App. 47 47 47 47 4
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 50 50 50 50 50
App. 32 42 41 44 44
Falsified Keys App. 36 79 86 81 6
Totals
Dir. 103 103 103 103 103
App. 115 168 174 172 54
All 218 271 277 275 157
Experiment 4 Results
Random
Control 1 2 3 Common
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 50 50 50 50 50
App. 50 50 50 50 9
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 48 48 48 48 48
App. 50 48 49 46 49
Falsified Keys App. 126 82 77 78 9
Totals
Dir. 98 98 98 98 98
App. 226 180 176 174 67
All 324 278 274 272 165
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Experiment 5 Results
Random
Control 1 2 3 Common
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 43 43 43 43 43
App. 57 57 57 57 4
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 41 41 41 41 41
App. 49 49 46 51 50
Falsified Keys App. 34 62 59 68 10
Totals
Dir. 84 84 84 84 84
App. 140 168 162 176 64
All 224 252 246 260 148
Experiment 6 Results
Random
Control 1 2 3 Common
Bad node with
Bad keys
Dir. 42 42 42 42 42
App. 58 56 56 56 3
Good nodes
with Bad keys
Dir. 39 39 39 39 39
App. 51 53 52 53 54
Falsified Keys App. 18 25 16 19 1
Totals
Dir. 81 81 81 81 81
App. 127 134 124 128 58
All 208 215 205 209 139
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